Use Argo CD with permissioned agents by treating every write operation as a policy decision, not a chat decision. In Claw EA, the control point is a WPC and a CST, so an agent running in OpenClaw cannot sync, rollback, or edit an application unless the policy explicitly allows it.
Prompt-only guardrails fail because the risky part is not “what the model says”, it is “what the execution layer can do”. Argo CD is an admin surface for shipping code, so agent access must be constrained by policy-as-code, least-privilege auth scopes, and verifiable run artifacts.
Step-by-step runbook
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Decide the agent’s Argo CD blast radius in operational terms. List the Argo CD projects, clusters, namespaces, and application names the agent can even see, and which operations are allowed (read-only, sync, rollback).
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Write a WPC that encodes those boundaries and publish it to the WPC registry. The WPC is a signed, hash-addressed policy artifact served by clawcontrols, and the agent run should pin to that policy hash when possible.
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Provision a dedicated Argo CD identity for the agent via enterprise buildout, connected via the official API. Keep it separate from human admins, and scope it to the minimum Argo CD RBAC needed for the specific apps and namespaces.
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Issue a CST for the job from clawscope with the scope hash aligned to the WPC, and enable optional policy hash pinning. Use job-scoped CST binding so a token minted for one run cannot be replayed into another run.
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Run the agent in OpenClaw with strict tool policy and sandboxing, and avoid elevated execution for deployment-related workflows. Treat the Argo CD capability as a tool that must be allowlisted per agent, and default the rest to deny.
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Route model calls through clawproxy so you get gateway receipts for every model call involved in the decision to touch Argo CD. At the end of the run, store the proof bundle and attach it to the change record, or publish a Trust Pulse for review.
Threat model
Argo CD is a control plane for delivery, so the high-impact failures are “unauthorized change” and “authorized change with the wrong target”. The table below focuses on failures caused by malicious or misconfigured skills/plugins, prompt injection in chat surfaces, and overbroad tool permissions.
| Threat | What happens | Control |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection triggers an unintended sync | An attacker convinces the agent to sync an app, promoting a bad revision or pushing drift into prod. | Require write/admin actions to pass WPC approval gates, and only issue a CST whose scope hash permits sync for a named allowlist of apps and namespaces. |
| Malicious plugin expands tool access | A plugin adds “helpful” behavior that calls Argo CD broadly, or routes around your proxy and logging. | OpenClaw tool allow/deny should be explicit, and Argo CD actions should be exposed only through the permissioned tool wrapper used in enterprise buildout, not arbitrary HTTP calls. |
| Over-privileged Argo CD credentials | The agent can change unrelated apps, projects, or clusters, turning a narrow task into a platform-wide incident. | Separate Argo CD identities per agent role, least-privilege RBAC, and WPC constraints that match the same boundaries. Treat “read” and “write” as different tools or different CST scopes. |
| Replay of a prior “approved” run | A captured token or approval artifact is reused to perform actions outside the intended job window. | Use marketplace anti-replay binding with job-scoped CST binding, and include the job identifiers in the proof bundle so verification can fail closed on mismatches. |
| Unverifiable incident timeline | After a rollback or outage, you cannot prove which model calls and operator inputs led to the Argo CD action. | Send model traffic through clawproxy to produce gateway receipts, then bundle them into a proof bundle for audit and verification. |
Policy-as-code example
This is a JSON-like sketch of a WPC for an Argo CD “safe deploy assistant” that can read broadly but can only sync and rollback one application in one namespace. In practice, your Argo CD connection is done via official API with enterprise buildout controls, and the agent receives a CST pinned to this policy hash.
{
"wpc_version": "v1",
"workload": {
"runtime": "openclaw",
"agent_name": "argo-deploy-assistant",
"environment": "prod"
},
"tools": {
"argo_cd": {
"mode": "official_api",
"allow": [
{ "action": "read", "apps": ["payments-api"], "namespaces": ["prod-canary"] },
{ "action": "sync", "apps": ["payments-api"], "namespaces": ["prod-canary"], "require_approval": true },
{ "action": "rollback", "apps": ["payments-api"], "namespaces": ["prod-canary"], "require_approval": true }
],
"deny": [
{ "action": "edit_app_spec" },
{ "action": "manage_projects" },
{ "action": "cluster_admin" }
]
}
},
"token": {
"cst": {
"max_ttl_seconds": 1800,
"scope_hash_required": true,
"policy_hash_pinning": "optional"
}
},
"audit": {
"require_gateway_receipts": true,
"produce_proof_bundle": true
}
}
The key point is that the policy is evaluated by the execution layer, not inferred from the prompt. The prompt can suggest a sync, but the tool call is denied unless the WPC permits it and the CST scope hash matches.
What proof do you get?
For every model call routed through clawproxy, you get gateway receipts that can be verified later. Those receipts are bundled with run metadata into a proof bundle, which you can attach to the change ticket or store for audit.
The proof bundle is useful when the question is “what did the model see and decide right before the Argo CD action happened?”. If you publish the run artifact as a Trust Pulse, reviewers get a consistent object to inspect without relying on ad hoc logs.
If you use OpenRouter via fal routed through clawproxy, the model traffic still produces gateway receipts. That keeps the verification story the same across model providers, as long as the agent run is configured to proxy model calls.
Rollback posture
Rollback for agent-driven delivery should be designed as a sequence of safe, fast actions. You want to be able to stop further writes, revert the workload, and preserve evidence without keeping privileged tokens alive.
| Action | Safe rollback | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Stop new agent writes | Revoke the CST in clawscope and rotate the Argo CD credential used by the agent identity. | CST revocation record plus the WPC hash that defined intended access. |
| Freeze the delivery surface | Disable automated sync for the affected app (or restrict it to human operators) via Argo CD admin process. | Change record tied to the job id, and the proof bundle showing which tool calls were attempted and denied or allowed. |
| Roll back the workload | Trigger a rollback only to an allowlisted application and namespace, and require explicit approval if your WPC mandates it. | Proof bundle with gateway receipts leading up to the rollback decision, plus job-scoped CST binding preventing replay. |
| Post-incident verification | Verify the proof bundle offline and publish a Trust Pulse for the incident review packet. | Receipts and bundle metadata suitable for later verification and audit. |
FAQ
Is this a native Argo CD connector in Claw EA?
No. Argo CD can be connected via official API with enterprise buildout controls, and write/admin actions require WPC approval gates, CST, and explicit least-privilege auth scopes.
Why not just tell the agent “never deploy to prod” in the prompt?
Because prompts do not constrain the execution layer. A compromised chat surface or a misaligned plugin can still call Argo CD unless the tool call is blocked by policy-as-code, enforced with a WPC and CST.
What is the minimum set of controls to start safely?
Start with a WPC that only permits read actions, plus a CST with a short TTL and scope hash required. Then add narrowly-scoped sync and rollback with approval requirements, one app at a time.
How do you audit what the model did before a sync or rollback?
Route model calls through clawproxy to obtain gateway receipts, then retain the proof bundle with the job metadata. This gives you a verifiable record of the model calls involved in the run.
Can we enforce network egress allowlists for the agent?
Egress allowlists enforced outside clawproxy are planned or can be implemented, depending on your environment. For now, treat egress as an infrastructure control you own, and keep tool access narrow in OpenClaw.