Google Workspace Admin access is high-impact because it can change identities, mail, files, and security settings for the whole domain. If you let an agent run these actions from prompt-only instructions, a single bad message or plugin bug can become an org-wide incident.
Claw EA runs OpenClaw as the baseline agent runtime, and adds a permissioned execution layer: policy-as-code gates (WPC), least-privilege credentials (CST), and verifiable audit artifacts (gateway receipts and proof bundles). For Google Workspace Admin, this integration is connectable via official API with enterprise buildout controls, not a native connector.
Step-by-step runbook
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Define the operational boundary for the agent. List exactly which admin tasks are allowed (for example: suspend a user, rotate recovery email, reset 2SV enrollment, read audit logs), and which are forbidden (for example: create super admins, relax domain-wide sharing, change routing rules).
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Write a WPC = Work Policy Contract (signed, hash-addressed policy artifact; served by clawcontrols) that encodes those allowed actions and required approvals. Keep it task-focused, with explicit resources and maximum counts per run.
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Choose an auth model for Google Workspace Admin via official API (OAuth, API key, or service account) as part of an enterprise buildout. For write and admin actions, require WPC approval gates, scoped tokens, and explicit least-privilege auth scopes.
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Issue a CST = scoped token (issued by clawscope) for the job, with a scope hash that matches your intended permissions. Optionally pin the policy hash so the CST is only valid when the exact WPC is in force.
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Run the agent in OpenClaw with a tight tool policy and sandboxing. Treat any “elevated” or host-exec capability as a separate risk decision, and keep the Google Admin tool isolated from general shell and browser tools unless you have a concrete need.
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Proxy model calls through clawproxy so you get gateway receipts for model calls. At the end of the run, export the proof bundle and store it for audit, incident response, and replay checks.
Threat model
Google Workspace Admin actions are not “just another API call.” Admin privileges can create durable access paths (new admins, delegated access, external forwarding) and can silently change controls that your security team relies on.
| Threat | What happens | Control |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection via email or chat content | The agent is tricked into resetting MFA, adding forwarding, or granting access while “following instructions.” | WPC gates for any write action; separate read-only vs write tools; require human approval for irreversible actions. |
| Over-scoped credentials | A single compromised run can affect every user or every group because the token can do too much. | CST issued per job with tight scope hash; least-privilege OAuth scopes in the enterprise buildout; short TTL and revocation readiness. |
| Plugin or tool misconfiguration | A “helper” tool calls an unintended Admin endpoint, or writes to the wrong OU/group because of a mapping bug. | WPC resource constraints (allowed org units, allowed groups); require explicit target identifiers; pre-flight “plan” step before execution. |
| Silent policy drift during a long-running agent | The agent keeps operating after requirements change (incident, freeze, or changed approvals). | Pin policy hash in CST (optional) so old runs cannot continue under a different WPC; job-scoped CST binding to prevent replay. |
| Disputed accountability after an incident | You cannot prove what the model saw, what it decided, and what was called, so investigations stall. | Gateway receipts from clawproxy for model calls; proof bundles that bind job metadata, token scope, and receipts for verification. |
Policy-as-code example
This sketch shows the kind of constraints you want when giving an agent any Google Workspace Admin capability. Encode intent (what, where, and how much), and require approvals for privileged changes.
{
"wpc_version": "1",
"integration": "google-admin",
"mode": "official_api",
"default": { "effect": "deny" },
"allow": [
{
"action": "directory.users.read",
"resource": "users/*"
},
{
"action": "directory.users.suspend",
"resource": "users/ou:Employees/*",
"constraints": {
"max_targets_per_job": 3,
"require_reason": true,
"require_approval": "human"
}
},
{
"action": "directory.users.reset_mfa",
"resource": "users/ou:Employees/*",
"constraints": {
"require_approval": "human",
"two_person_rule": true
}
}
],
"deny": [
{ "action": "directory.roles.*" },
{ "action": "directory.admin.*" },
{ "action": "gmail.routing.*" }
],
"audit": {
"require_gateway_receipts": true,
"emit_proof_bundle": true
}
}
In practice, you tie this WPC to a job-specific CST, and the tool adapter refuses calls that do not match the WPC. This is the core difference versus prompt-only “please be careful” instructions, which a model can ignore or misunderstand.
What proof do you get?
For model calls, clawproxy emits gateway receipts, so you can later verify what model was called and bind those calls to a specific job and CST. Receipts are useful when you need to prove that a run did or did not consult a particular model, at a particular time, under a particular policy.
At the run level, Claw EA produces a proof bundle that packages the receipts plus run metadata needed for audit and verification. If you publish or store it in Trust Pulse, you have a consistent artifact for internal review, vendor risk workflows, and post-incident forensics.
For Google Workspace Admin specifically, you should also retain vendor-side audit logs in your own environment, then correlate them to your job metadata. Claw EA does not replace Google’s logs; it gives you a job-scoped chain from “who authorized” to “what the model called” to “what your tool executed.”
Rollback posture
Admin actions differ in reversibility: some changes are easy to revert (re-enable a suspended user), others are lossy or time-sensitive (mail routing, sharing exposure, deleted data). Your rollout should treat “rollback” as a first-class plan, not a hopeful manual step.
| Action | Safe rollback | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Suspend user | Unsuspend the same user; confirm sign-in and session behavior. | WPC approval record, job CST, proof bundle, and correlated Google audit entry. |
| Reset MFA / 2SV enrollment | Re-enroll under helpdesk workflow; verify recovery channels before and after. | Proof bundle with the approval gate and the exact tool call inputs. |
| Group membership change | Revert membership diff; review downstream access that group controls. | Job-scoped anti-replay binding plus a stored plan step for the intended diff. |
| Sharing or routing changes | Often complex; treat as high-risk and require higher approval or forbid for agents. | Enforced WPC deny rules; evidence that the tool refused the call when attempted. |
Operationally: start with read-only admin surfaces, then allow a small set of write actions with strict limits, and only then expand. If you cannot explain the rollback in two steps, do not let an agent do it unattended.
FAQ
Is this a native Google Workspace Admin connector in Claw EA?
No. Google Workspace Admin can be connected via official API with enterprise buildout controls, and your deployment decides the auth method (OAuth, API key, or service account) and scopes.
Why is policy-as-code necessary instead of prompt-only guardrails?
Prompt-only guardrails are not enforcement. A WPC is checked by the execution layer, so the tool call is denied even if the model tries to proceed, and the CST can be pinned to that policy hash to prevent drift.
What does “least privilege” look like for admin agents?
It means the CST scope hash and the vendor auth scopes only allow the minimum set of endpoints and resources for the job. It also means separating read-only tools from write tools, and requiring approvals for any write that changes access or identity posture.
What audit artifacts should we expect after a run?
You get gateway receipts for model calls (from clawproxy) and a proof bundle that packages receipts and run metadata for verification. You should also correlate with Google’s own audit logs for the underlying admin events.
How do replay and “run it again later” risks get handled?
Claw EA supports marketplace anti-replay binding using job-scoped CST binding. That reduces the risk that a captured token or run context can be reused to repeat admin actions outside the approved job window.