Okta for permissioned agents means this: if an AI agent can provision users, reset factors, or change group membership, every action must be enforced by machine-checked policy, not by prompt instructions. In Claw EA, OpenClaw is the baseline runtime, and Okta access is gated by Work Policy Contracts and scoped tokens so the agent cannot exceed its assigned blast radius.
Prompt-only guardrails are advisory. Permissioned execution binds identity, scope, and policy to each call, and produces verifiable receipts for audit.
Step-by-step runbook
- Define the blast radius. Enumerate which Okta resources the agent may touch via official API. Separate read-only tasks from write or admin actions.
- Author a WPC. Create a Work Policy Contract that encodes allowed operations, target orgs, and change windows. Publish it to the WPC registry so it can be fetched and verified at run time.
- Issue a CST. Use clawscope to mint a scoped token with a scope hash that matches the Okta permissions required. Optionally pin the policy hash to the WPC so the token is invalid outside that contract.
- Run inside OpenClaw with sandboxing. Configure tool policy and sandbox mode so only the Okta integration tool is callable. Avoid elevated host execution unless explicitly required and approved.
- Route model calls through clawproxy. All model traffic flows through clawproxy to emit gateway receipts. This ensures the reasoning path that triggered an Okta action is receipted.
- Collect the proof bundle. At job completion, store the proof bundle and optionally publish a Trust Pulse for audit review.
Threat model
Okta is a high-impact control plane. A mis-scoped agent can create privileged users, disable MFA, or add backdoor group memberships.
| Threat | What happens | Control and Action | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection in a chat channel | Attacker convinces the agent to add their account to an admin group | Tool policy restricts callable tools; WPC requires explicit approval gate for write actions; CST limits allowed API scopes | Gateway receipts plus WPC hash in proof bundle |
| Malicious or compromised skill/plugin | Hidden logic performs bulk user exports or privilege escalation | OpenClaw sandboxing with minimal workspace access; no elevated host exec; CST scope hash pinned to least privilege | Sandbox config and receipts in proof bundle |
| Token leakage | Stolen credentials used outside intended job | Job-scoped CST binding and short TTL; revocation via clawscope | CST claims and revocation logs |
| Config drift | Agent runs with broader tool profile than intended | Regular OpenClaw security audit; WPC fetched and verified at runtime | Audit output and policy hash verification |
OpenClaw provides local sandboxing and tool policy controls to reduce blast radius, but these must be combined with remote policy enforcement and token scoping for enterprise use.
Policy-as-code example
Below is a simplified JSON-like snippet illustrating how an Okta write agent can be constrained.
{
"wpc": {
"policy_hash": "b64u_hash_here",
"tool_allowlist": ["okta.users.read", "okta.groups.read", "okta.groups.assign"],
"write_requires_approval": true,
"change_window_utc": "09:00-17:00"
},
"cst": {
"scope_hash": "sha256_of_okta_scopes",
"ttl_seconds": 900,
"policy_hash_pin": "b64u_hash_here"
},
"runtime": {
"sandbox_mode": "all",
"elevated_exec": "disabled"
}
}
The WPC defines allowed operations and approval gates. The CST binds the run to a specific scope hash and optionally the exact policy hash, preventing drift.
What proof do you get?
Every model call routed through clawproxy emits gateway receipts. These receipts are signed and included in a proof bundle together with WPC references, CST claims, and run metadata.
The proof bundle can be verified post hoc to confirm that the agent operated under the declared policy and scope. You can store and view the artifact as a Trust Pulse for audit or incident response.
This is the difference between “the agent was told to behave” and “the agent could not behave outside policy.”
Rollback posture
| Failure | Immediate action | Safe rollback | Evidence retained |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unexpected group assignment | Revoke CST and disable agent | Reapply known-good group state via approved run | Proof bundle showing offending call |
| Over-broad scope detected | Reissue CST with reduced scope hash | Update WPC and re-pin policy hash | CST issuance logs and WPC registry entry |
| Sandbox misconfiguration | Switch sandbox mode to "all" and remove elevated tools | Rerun job under corrected config | OpenClaw audit output |
Rollback is operational, not rhetorical. Tokens are revocable, policies are hash-addressed, and each run is independently verifiable.
FAQ
Can I connect Okta today?
Okta can be connected via official API with enterprise buildout controls. This page does not imply a native connector; write and admin actions require WPC approval gates, scoped tokens, and explicit least-privilege auth scopes.
Why is prompt-level authorization insufficient?
Prompts can be overridden by injection or by a compromised skill. Only policy-as-code enforced at execution time, combined with scoped tokens, guarantees that disallowed Okta APIs cannot be called.
Does OpenClaw sandboxing replace identity controls?
No. Sandboxing reduces filesystem and host risk, but it does not constrain remote API permissions. Identity scope and WPC enforcement are required for Okta operations.
What audit artifacts should my security team expect?
You should receive gateway receipts for model calls, CST claims showing scope hash and TTL, and the WPC policy hash. These are bundled into a proof bundle and can be published as a Trust Pulse.
How does this align with Okta’s guidance on securing AI agents?
Okta emphasizes enterprise-grade authorization and secure integration patterns for AI agents. Claw EA complements this by enforcing machine-checked policy and producing verifiable execution artifacts.