Credential rotation and secrets hygiene for enterprise agents is safest when rotation is executed as a permissioned workflow: the agent can prepare and validate changes, but final secret writes and invalidations require policy-controlled approvals. In Claw EA, OpenClaw is the baseline agent runtime, and the execution layer is gated by policy-as-code so prompt text cannot silently widen access.
Use WPC = Work Policy Contract (signed, hash-addressed policy artifact; served by clawcontrols) to define what “rotation” is allowed to do, use CST = scoped token (issued by clawscope) to bind runtime scope to that WPC, and route model calls through clawproxy so you get Gateway receipts and a proof bundle for audit and rollback.
Step-by-step runbook
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Define the rotation boundary and inventory. Enumerate which secrets are in scope (API keys, OAuth client secrets, database passwords), which systems consume them, and what “done” means (all workloads updated, old credential invalidated, monitoring green).
Write down irreversible actions for this run: rotate API keys, invalidate sessions, update secret stores. Treat each as a separate approval gate, not a single “rotate everything” button.
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Create a WPC that permits only the minimum rotation actions. Make “read-only discovery” a separate phase from “write secret” and “revoke old secret,” and force step-up approvals for the write and revoke phases.
Pin the WPC hash in the job so the agent cannot swap to a broader policy mid-run. Operationally, this is what makes execution permissioned instead of prompt-only.
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Issue a CST for the job from clawscope, scoped to the specific rotation target. Use CST scope hash and optional policy hash pinning so the token is only valid under the intended WPC and only for the rotation job context.
Use short TTLs and prefer job-scoped tokens so replay is harder. If you need longer work windows, re-issue new CSTs per phase instead of extending TTL.
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Run the agent in OpenClaw with a tight tool policy and sandbox. Keep “discover current config” tools available, but isolate any tool that can write to secret stores behind an approval-gated tool entry.
In OpenClaw terms, ensure you are not accidentally allowing elevated host execution for the rotation workflow unless you explicitly need it. Confirm effective policy with the OpenClaw sandbox and tool policy inspector before starting.
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Phase 1: discovery and plan generation (no writes). The agent pulls current usage locations via official API or via MCP server, identifies consumers, proposes a rotation plan, and generates a change set with exact diffs and a backout plan.
At the end of Phase 1, require a human step-up approval and a two-person rule sign-off on the plan. The approval should reference the WPC hash and the change set hash.
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Phase 2: create new credential and stage it. The agent requests creation of the new key or secret but does not revoke the old one yet; it updates a limited canary consumer first, then expands rollout only after health checks pass.
Gate secret writes with the second step-up approval. If your secret store supports versions, keep both versions available until verification completes.
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Phase 3: revoke old credential and invalidate sessions. Only after rollout verification should the agent execute revocation and session invalidation, and this phase should require the strictest approval gate.
Export the proof bundle for the run, and store it alongside the change record. If you publish externally, store a Trust Pulse for audit/viewing.
Threat model
| Threat | What happens | Control |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection expands the action from “rotate key A” to “dump secrets” | The agent is induced to exfiltrate credentials or widen access, especially if it has broad tool access. | Permissioned execution via WPC plus tool allow/deny in OpenClaw. WPC hash pinning in CST so the job cannot switch policies mid-run. |
| Single operator compromise triggers irreversible rotation | An attacker rotates keys, locks out systems, or plants credentials they control. | Two-person rule and step-up approvals for (1) secret write and (2) old credential revocation. Separate phases so one approval cannot complete the full attack path. |
| Token replay across jobs or environments | A captured token is reused to perform rotation actions later or in a different job. | Marketplace anti-replay binding using job-scoped CST binding. Short TTLs and job metadata binding in the CST. |
| Over-broad secret store access | The agent can access unrelated secrets and cause cross-service impact. | Secrets isolation: scope CST to a single secret path or logical secret id, and require explicit allowlists in the WPC for which secret identifiers can be touched. |
| Unverifiable change record after incident | You cannot prove which model calls were made, which policy was in force, or who approved. | Route model calls through clawproxy to obtain Gateway receipts. Bundle receipts, WPC hash, CST scope hash, and approvals metadata into a proof bundle for audit/verification. |
| Local workstation exposure during rotation | Secrets leak via logs, permissive filesystem permissions, or a tool running on host. | OpenClaw security audit and sandboxing, plus redaction settings. Avoid elevated host execution for rotation unless required, and keep credential files permissioned. |
Policy-as-code example
This example shows the shape of a WPC for rotation work. It is intentionally narrow: discovery is allowed, writes and revokes require step-up approvals, and secret identifiers are explicit.
{
"wpc_version": "v1",
"purpose": "credential-rotation",
"policy": {
"target_secrets": [
"secret://prod/payments/stripe_api_key",
"secret://prod/ci/github_app_private_key"
],
"phases": [
{
"name": "discover",
"tools_allow": ["read_config", "list_consumers", "health_check"],
"secrets": { "read": true, "write": false, "revoke": false },
"approvals": { "step_up": "none", "two_person_rule": false }
},
{
"name": "stage_new_secret",
"tools_allow": ["create_secret_version", "deploy_config", "health_check"],
"secrets": { "read": true, "write": true, "revoke": false },
"approvals": { "step_up": "required", "two_person_rule": true }
},
{
"name": "revoke_old_secret",
"tools_allow": ["revoke_credential", "invalidate_sessions", "health_check"],
"secrets": { "read": false, "write": false, "revoke": true },
"approvals": { "step_up": "required", "two_person_rule": true }
}
],
"token_constraints": {
"cst_ttl_seconds_max": 900,
"require_policy_hash_pinning": true
}
}
}
Why policy-as-code instead of prompt-only: prompts describe intent, but they do not enforce capability boundaries. The WPC is a machine-checked contract that the execution layer can fetch/verify and apply consistently, even when the agent output is manipulated.
What proof do you get?
For model traffic routed through clawproxy, you receive Gateway receipts for model calls. Those receipts can be bundled with run metadata into a proof bundle so you can verify what was requested of the model, under what job scope, and under what policy hash.
Operationally, the proof bundle should include: WPC hash, CST scope hash (and whether policy hash pinning was required), timestamps, approval references, and the set of Gateway receipts. If you need a shareable audit artifact, publish the run as a Trust Pulse for audit/viewing.
Rollback posture
| Action | Safe rollback | Evidence to check |
|---|---|---|
| Create new credential (but do not revoke old) | Stop rollout and keep old credential active. Delete the new credential if it was never deployed, or disable it if supported. | Proof bundle shows Phase 2 completion without Phase 3. Confirm canary health checks and config deploy receipts. |
| Deploy secret to a subset of consumers | Revert config to previous version and rotate back consumers to the old credential. Keep the new credential disabled until root cause is found. | Change set hash and deployment logs referenced by the run record. Gateway receipts confirm no additional model-directed actions beyond the plan. |
| Revoke old credential | Restore service by re-issuing a credential and re-deploying, then re-run rotation properly. If revocation is irreversible, treat this as incident response with service restoration priority. | Approval records for the revocation step and proof bundle coverage of the revoke action. Verify the WPC hash matches the approved policy. |
| Invalidate sessions | Re-authenticate users or services using documented procedures. If session invalidation causes widespread outages, temporarily reduce enforcement where possible while you re-issue valid tokens. | Proof bundle metadata tying the invalidation step to explicit approval. Confirm blast radius matches the WPC target list. |
Rotation workflows should default to “two-key overlap” where possible: stage new, verify, then revoke. If a system cannot support overlap, treat it as a special-case WPC with tighter approvals and shorter execution windows.
FAQ
How often should we rotate secrets for agent workflows?
Rotate on a schedule that matches your exposure and recovery capacity, and rotate immediately after suspected compromise. If the secret is high privilege or broadly deployed, prefer shorter rotation intervals and phase-based rollouts to reduce outage risk.
Why can’t we just tell the agent “only rotate this one key”?
Because prompt text is not an enforcement boundary. A permissioned execution layer uses WPC rules plus scoped CST constraints so the runtime refuses actions that are outside the contract, even if the agent output asks for them.
How do step-up approvals and the two-person rule work in practice?
Use your existing change management system and identity provider to collect approvals, then feed the approval reference into the job context. The WPC should require approvals for secret writes and revocations, and the run should record who approved and what policy hash they approved.
Do we have to route model calls through clawproxy?
If you want Gateway receipts for model calls, yes. You can still run OpenClaw with other providers, but you will not get the same receipt trail for verification unless the traffic is routed through clawproxy.
How do we keep secrets out of logs and artifacts?
Keep secrets in a dedicated secret store and pass only references into the agent where possible. Use OpenClaw security audit and redaction settings, and avoid mounting secret material into the sandbox filesystem unless the workflow requires it.